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Abstract—In recent years, with the development of mobile devices, the location based services (LBSs) have become more and more
prevailing and most applications installed on these devices call for location information. Yet, the untrusted LBS provider can collect
these location information, which may potentially threaten users’ location privacy. In view of this challenge, we propose a two-tier
schema for the privacy preservation based on k−anonymity principle meanwhile reduce the cost for privacy protection. Concretely, we
divide the users into groups in order to maximize the privacy level and in each group one proxy is selected to generate dummy
locations and share the returned results from LBS provider; then, on each group, an auction mechanism is proposed to determine the
payment of each user to the proxy as the compensation, which satisfies budget balance and incentive compatibility. To evalue the
performance of the proposed schema, a simulated experiment is conducted.
Index Terms—LBS, privacy preservation, k-anonymity, auction
F
1 INTRODUCTION
R Ecently, smart phones and other portable network ac-cessible devices have gained great popularity for its
convenience. LBSs have been more and more prevailing
and became a new service paradigm. Generally, users with
smart phones download the applications from Google Play
or Apple Store and install these applications on their smart
phones to enjoy a variety of location-based services. Gener-
ally, this procedure is performed that users submit a query
with their location information to the LBS provider and get
their point of interests within a range. For instance, they can
query the hotel price in the neighborhood, the evaluation
towards a restaurant, the nearby hospital, etc.
Although users benefit a lot from the convenience of
LBSs , users are subject to untrusted location based service
provider. These attackers can mine the collected location
information of users, together with other side information
from public website such as twitter, facebook, yelp, etc, and
infer the true identity of the user. Thus, LBS users are faced
with severe privacy exposure.
To protect the location privacy, many methods have been
proposed to make it difficult for the attacker to accurately
infer the true location of users. These methods mainly
include data transformation [1], [2], k-anonymity [3], [4],
mix zone [5] [6], dummy location [7], differential privacy [8]
[9], etc.
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Fig. 1. The procedure of the LBS with k-anonymity: 1. users submit LBS
requests with pseudonyms and CA collects these locations from users;
2. CA obtains a minimum bounding region and the region is submitted
to LBS server; 3. LBS server returns the search results to CA; 4. CA
removes the false results and returns the final results to the user.
Among these methods, k-anonymity method is exten-
sively deployed in the existing researcher and has been
shown its effectiveness [3], [4]. The main idea behind
k-anonymity based methods is that the true location is
screened by the other k-1 dummy locations and thus add
uncertainty to the inference of the attacker. Generally, k-
anonymity based method is based on the assumption that
there exists a high-performance trusted Central Authority
(CA). Fig.1 shows, in the procedure of LBSs, the CA acts
as the anonymizer who collects the locations of different
k users and utilize spatial-temporal cloaking or location
obfuscation techniques to obtain a minimum bounding re-
gion [10]. Next, the CA submit this pack containing the
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obfuscated location information to the LBS server. Finally,
the service provider processes the input query information
and returns to the CA a collection of candidate results. After
removing the false result, the CA sends the final results back
to the customer.
To some degree, these methods surely protect location
privacy. However, these methods would also leads to the
location information coarse-grained, which will more or less
degrades the quality of service. Moreover, these methods
are inevitably faced with the single-point failure problem.
If the central authority breaks down or it cannot process
all the incoming requests, the privacy of users cannot be
guaranteed. Attackers can also obtain side information, such
as the history query probability of each PoI. With the help of
these side information, the attacker can easily eliminate lo-
cations with little query probability and make ineffective the
traditional k-anonymity based privacy protection methods.
To protect the location privacy of the customer and
meanwhile guarantee the quality of service, R.Lu et al. [11]
proposed PLAM framework which did’t involve the central
authority. X.Zhu et al [12] proposed a collaborative system
”MobiCache”, which improved the hit ratio and reduced the
cost of privacy protection.
Generally, a user sends information such as his own
id, his location, RoI (region of interest) and PoI (point of
interest) to the LBS provider. To save his privacy, he generate
dummy locations and dummy PoIs and enlarged RoI. Our
work is based on the following observations: i) the enlarged
query scope make useless the majority of the returned
results, which is a great waste of resources; ii) the user in
the vicinity may well require the similar LBS and a content
sharing can decrease the cost on the privacy protection;
iii) when a user acts as proxy and shares the data with
other users, it is not reasonable that the user undertakes
all the cost of generating the dummy location. To stimulate
user to undertake the role as a proxy, his cost of dummy
location generation should be compensated and too much
compensation would increase the cost of privacy protection.
In this paper, we propose a two-tier cost sharing mecha-
nism to preserve location privacy. The contributions that we
make in this paper are listed as follows:
• We propose a method to divide users into group in
order to share data with users in vicinity and mean-
while maximize the entropy. The proposed group
division method is immune to the inference attack
from attachers with side information.
• To motivate people to be the proxy, generate dummy
information and share data with others, we propose
a cost sharing mechanism based on auction.
• We prove that the proposed auction mechanism sat-
isfies budget balance and incentive compatibility.
• We conduct an experiment evaluate the performance
of our proposed schema.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents the relate work; Section 3 models the
scenario of our problem and gives a brief introduction of the
preliminary knowledge ; Section 4 presents the basic idea
of our proposed schema and formally defines the problem;
Section 5 and Section 6 presents the algorithm and gives
a theoretical analysis about the solution to the problem
and the evaluation of the proposed method is presented in
Section 7; Section 8 concludes this paper.
2 RELATE WORK
In this section, we review the existing researches on privacy
protection of LBSs and the related incentive mechanism.
2.1 Privacy Metrics
Privacy metric selection is vital in the design of privacy
protection algorithm in that the metric is generally the objec-
tive function to optimize. It more or less reflects the design
principle. One major principle is that how accurately the
attacker can infer the user’s true location. A better algorithm
should make it harder for the attacker to determine the true
location. Entropy is widely utilized [13] as a measure of the
uncertainty to determine the true location of a user. Other
metrics, such as k-anonymity [14], t-closeness [15], [16], and
other variations, measure the privacy level according to the
size of anonymity set.
The above metrics are uncertainty based. B.Niu et al.
used another metric, CR (Cloaking Region), which is based
on the intuition that a larger cloaking region can make it
more difficult for the attacker to determine the true location
of a user. However, in our work, we concern primarily on
the privacy level when dividing users into groups, we adopt
entropy to measure the location privacy.
2.2 Privacy Protection Methods
Most of the exsisting researches on promoting location
privacy level is to add uncertainty to the inference of at-
tackers. These methods includes pseudomyzation [17]. data
transformation [1], [2], k-anonymity [3], [4], [18], mix zone
[5] [6], dummy location [7], differential privacy [8] [9].
Among these methods, k-anonymity is the mainstream
in location privacy preservation and has enjoyed great suc-
cess. [3], [4] proved that k-anonymity method can guar-
antee the security of LBS users. These methods, generally
assume that there exists a trusted and high-performance
central authority who acts as the broker between the service
provider and users. LBS provider can also find a third party
server such as cloud server and store the LBS data there
by a data as a service (DaaS) model [19] [20]. This service
approach avoid the necessity of a single central authority
and therefore is free from the single point failure. Generally
an attribute-based encryption [21] [22] scheme is explored
in some LBS system to achieve fine-grained access control
on the LBS data.
X. Zhu et al [12] proposed a concept MobiCache consider-
ing the spatio-temporal relation among users and designed
a collaborative system to increase the hit ratio. A. K. Tyagi
et al. [23] concerned about the location privacy problem
in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) and proposed a
solution based on mix zone. Qiu et al. [24] and K.Vu et
al. [25] studied the privacy problem in the participatory
sensing scenario.
Other researches concern the privacy protection when
the attackers have the side information and launch an
inference attack towards users. B.Niu et al. [26] proposed
a dummy location selection method, which can overcome
2377-3782 (c) 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TSUSC.2017.2733018, IEEE
Transactions on Sustainable Computing
IEEE TRANSACTION ON SUSTAINABLE COMPUTING 3
the single-point failure and does not rely on the central-
ized trusted anonymizer. In their work, the final dummy
locations are selected according to entropy and area of
cloaking area. D.Liao et al. [27] proposed a greedy-based
method, k−DLCA, to select dummy locations, taking into
consideration the semantic information of these locations.
2.3 Incentive Mechanism
An incentive mechanism is crucial in the location privacy
preservation, especially in the scenario that the protection
method goes in a collaborative way. Feng et al. [16] de-
signed a truthful auction for location-aware collaborative
sensing in mobile crowdsourcing. Yang et al. [28] proposed
auction-based motive mechanisms to incentive users to help
others achieve k-anonymity. [29] proposed an auction based
mechanism which stimulates those who are indifferent to
privacy protection to participate in the anonymity set. X.Liu
et al. [30] model the dummy generation process using
game theory and the existence of Bayesian Nash Equilibria
(BNE) was analyzed. In our work, we hope to stimulate
users to undertake the task of dummy location generation
meanwhile reduce the cost. A mechanism therefore should
satisfy incentive compatibility. The incentive compatibility
[31] can be categorized into dominant strategy incentive




In this section, we introduce some basic knowledge about
location privacy and several important concepts used in our
paper and the metric for privacy preservation.
An untrusted location-based service provider may well
utilize the position information from the query which is
generally in a JSON format. In this paper, we emphasize
the situation where the untrusted location-based service
provider proposes an inference attack towards users by a
probabilistic model which utilizes side information. There
are a variety of side information that an attacker can collect
and utilize, such as posts of twitter, a registration to certain
location, query information and so forth, which users post
voluntarily. In this paper, to avoid ambiguity, we give a
explicit definition of side information.
Definition 1. The side information S refers to a user’s query
probability in an area, which is counted according to history
records. It reflects the popularity degree of a certain location in
history.
In this paper, an entropy-based privacy metric [32] is
adopted to measure the degree of anonymity for LBSs.
Entropy reflects how certain attackers can recognize the true
location of the user from the anonymity candidate set.
qi =
# of queries in location i
# of queries in all locations
(1)
To calculate the entropy, the query probability of each
dummy location is needed and can be calculated according
to equation (1). This process calls for the history record
data of all the interested locations, which reflects semantic
meanings. In the dummy location set D = {l1, l2, . . . , lk},





where pi is the normalized location probability so that∑k





The entropy reaches its maximum when the pi is uniformly
distributed, formally ∀i, j, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, . . . , k we have
pi = pj . In this situation, the optimal entropy is identically
H(u) = klog2k. Another perspective supporting this idea is
that the real location of a user is perfectly protected by the
dummy locations with the same distribution probability.
3.2 System Model of LBS
A typical LBS system usually consists of two main com-
ponents, i.e., LBS users and LBS providers. In detail, LBS
users utilize sensors on mobile devices to obtain the ac-
curate location information and then submit it to the LBS
providers for location based service. Next, LBS providers
search the location related information and recommend the
corresponding results to LBS users. During this process, in
order to protect location privacy, LBS users usually adopt
the pseudonyms to hide their true identities. Unfortunately,
this simple measure cannot fully prevent the leakage of
location privacy of LBS users, since untrusted LBS provider
may make full use of the side information to infer and
confirm the location information with the true identity.
For a user who asks for LBS , the query mainly consists
of the following elements [27]:
• identity, which is the unique identification of a user
and denoted by uid;
• position, which is generally represented by location
coordinate l = (x, y);
• range of RoI (Region of Interest), which is the area
a user concerns about and is denoted by R;
• PoI (Point of interest), which is the concrete point
category a user cares about, such as a restaurant, a
hospital, a movie theater, etc and denoted by P .
Therefore, a query Q can be viewed as a 4-tuple, formally
Q = {uid, (x, y), R, P}. To implement the k−anonymity
of the location, k − 1 dummy locations are generated and
denoted by {l1, l2, . . . , lk−1} and k is determined by the
privacy level that a user needs. A larger k can ensure a
higher privacy level. When the user’s real RoI is R, he can
enlarge his region of interest to R¯ to hide his real needs and
therefore protect his own privacy. The location of a user is
readily subject to some sensitive location query, because of
the limited number of these places such as hospitals, gas
stations, etc. In this situation, the user can expand his PoI
into a larger set {P1, P2, . . . , Pm}. Therefore, the final query
is Q¯ = {uid, {l1, l2, . . . , lk}, R¯, {P1, P2, . . . , Pm}}.
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3.3 Adversary Modeling
Suppose that there is an attacker who attempts to connect
the anonymous location with the true identity of a LBS
user. In general, the attacker firstly collects side information
and then launches an inference attack. In detail, we restrict
the side information as location query probability. And the
attacker may also have the knowledge about the mechanism
how users protect their privacy.
Meanwhile, we suppose that the untrusted LBS provider
won’t actively track the users directly and accumulate ac-
curate side information of certain users. The LBS provider
can query its log database and know the history probability
of each positions which users ask for LBS requests. The
provider can also monitor the current service requests with
location information.
Let Gi denotes the dummy locations a user ui sends to
the LBS server. An inference attack is to utilize the prob-
ability Pr(li|Gi) to measure the similarity between each
potential position li and side information S. We assume
that the priori knowledge is derived from the uniform
distribution, i.e., Pr(li) = 1k . Besides, the side information is
independent on user i. Therefore, according to the Bayesian
theorem, we have
Pr(li|Gi) = P (Gi|li))Pr(li)
Pr(Gi)
. (4)
The adversary meanwhile knows exactly about the
mechanism how the users protect their privacy. The users’
location privacy are leaked when the adversary is able to
infer the users’ real location from the location information.
Moreover, when the LBS server is compromised by the ad-
versary, the adversary can get all private information stored
in the LBS server. Therefore, in this paper we suppose that
the LBS provider is the adversary.
4 PROBLEM STATEMENT
4.1 Motivation
A typical LBS procedure goes as following: a user sends
a query to the LBS provider, with information such as
identity, PoI, RoI and the GPS position, etc. A k−anonymity
method is adopted by collecting the information of other
k − 1 users nearby. These information are first sent to
a trusted anonymizer and the anonymizer replaces these
exact locations by a cloaking region. There are mainly three
weaknesses of this method. First, this privacy protection
method is subject to the single-point failure problem. If
the anonymizer breaks down, the privacy of users cannot
be guaranteed. Second, the anonymizer may well be the
bottleneck of the system especially when there are a large
quantity of incoming service requests. Last but not the least,
the quality of service is degraded by the lower accuracy of
provided position.
Fig.2 shows, in an area paved by hexagons, the gray-
colored hexagons represent popular locations while the
hallow hexagons represents locations with lower query pos-
sibility. To protect the true location, the user in location 1
generates 2 other dummy locations. However, the dummy
position 2 and 3 have a very low query probability and in
reality, this position may be lakes, mountain, etc. that a user
can never reach. The attacker can easily filter this kind of
Fig. 2. A motivation example
dummy locations with the help of side information. In our
case, the 3−anonymity is reduced into a 1−anonymity and
therefore the user’s true location is exposed to the attacker.
When a user asks for very sensitive information such as
where is the nearest gas station, the user may well add other
dummy information such as dummy PoI, dummy RoI into
the query to hide his true intention. The user can get many
returned results that are useless.
Therefore, it is valid that the locations with similar query
probability are sorted into the same group and camouflage
each other. We also assume that, users in the same hexagon
with certain range have the same returned results when
their requests information contain the same PoIs and RoI.
Once a user in such a group ask for a service request, he
can act as a proxy and store the returned results in his own
buffer for a while. Other users in the same group can search
the buffer and fetch the matched data within hops. To better
depict this problem, we solicit to the following definition.
Definition 2. A group G is all active LBS sers on a certain
number of hexagons, while these hexagons represent a subset of
an area Ψ . In the following discussion, we use G(pi) denotes
users on hexagons pi and use pi(G) denotes the hexagons these
users takes up.
According to the definition of the group, it is easy to see
that all users in the area Ψ is a group and a group G can be
divided into n sub-groups Λ = {G1, G2, . . . , Gd} satisfying





and ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . d} and i 6= j,
Gi
⋂
Gj = ∅, (6)
where Λ represents a division of the group G.
A group is the basic unit in our paper to preserve
privacy and share returned results from the LBS provider.
The definition of group also indicates that the division
of users is accompanied with the division of area, which
on the hexagon as a unit. The population information is
important in the cost sharing phase. The population of each
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hexagon is counted according to the location information
the user sends. And as the population of users within an
area changes slowly rather than drastically, we update these
information every few minutes.
Based on these observations, a two-tier scheme is pro-
posed in order to maximize the privacy level in a given area
with the least cost.
4.2 Problem Formulation
The generation of k − 1 dummy locations and sharing of
the returned results with other users in the same group are
inevitably accompanied with some cost (e.g. the commu-
nication, energy consumption, etc). The cost for the user i
is denoted by ci. In a group, it is sufficient that only one
user acts as a proxy to generate the k − 1 dummy locations
and shares the returned results with others during a certain
time interval. The cost of privacy preservation for group Gi
is denoted by Ci. In our paper, we adopt an auction-based
motive mechanisms to determine which user undertake the
role as the proxy. Therefore, if uj of group Gi is selected as
a proxy, the cost of group Gi is equivalent to the cost of uj ,
namely Ci = cj .
We suppose that the number of hexagons which a group
G takes up is no larger than a constant Πmax. This is rea-
sonable because of the limited computation, communication
and storage capacity of the selected user in the group.
With the rigorous definition and system modeling, here,
we formally define our problem and reduce it to an opti-
mization problem with several constraints.
The proposition for the problem are listed as following:
• an area Ψ, which is seamlessly paved by N same-
sized and same-shaped hexagons,
• M users {u1, u2, . . . , um} who are active and call for
LBSs,
• N hexagons {pi1, pi2, . . . , pin}, each hexagon pii has αi
active users and
∑N
i=1 αi = M .
• time period T for result sharing,
• cost of each user,
• side information S.
The optimization problem is to maximize the cost effective-









i=1 Ci represents the total cost for all users and the
numerator represents the sum of privacy level.
It is hard to satisfy the objective function (7) directly. The
primary goal is to maximize the entropy and protect our
users from the inference attack of adversaries. Therefore, to
solve this problem, we propose a two-tier schema: first, we
propose a method to divide the group into d sub-groups in
order to maximize the total entropy; second, we propose an
auction-based mechanism to minimize the total cost.
4.3 Notations
Table 1 introduces the main symbols and notations used in
our paper.
TABLE 1
Table of Key Notations
Notation Description
Ψ An area
pii The ith hexagon
ui The ith user
Πmax The largest number of hexagon a group can take up
S Side information
Q A query containing basic information
Q¯ A query with dummy information
T Time period for sharing result
R Region of interests
P Categories of point of interests (e.g. restaurant, hospital, etc.)
G A group, which is made up of users on several pi
Λ A division of group G.
αi The population of users taking up the ith hexagon
l Location information, which is made up of two coordinate
H The entropy, which represents the privacy level
qi The query probability of the ith PoI
pi The normalized query probability of the ith PoI
ci cost of generating K − 1 dummy locations for ui
Ci cost of generating dummy locations for group Gi
5 A GROUP DIVISION ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose an group division method to
maximize the privacy level as a whole. Meanwhile, we
demonstrate how the proposed method is immune to the
inference attack from the untrusted LBS provider.
5.1 Proposed Algorithm
In this subsection, we propose a greedy-based algorithm
to maximize the total entropy. Our objective function is to
maximize the numerator of equation (7), and since the users
in the same group share the same privacy level, therefore,










|pi(Gi)| < Πmax, i = 1, 2, . . . , d,
where |Gi| represents the number of users in the sub-
group Gi and |pi(Gi)| represents the number of hexagons
these users take up. The entropy for the group Gi can be
readily computed by the equation (2), (3).
When partitioning the users, we set the hexagon with
more population a higher priority. We first sort the hexagons
according to the number of users that the hexagon takes
up. Formally, the original ordered set {pi1, pi2, . . . , piN}
is mapped to the set {pi′1, pi
′
2, . . . , pi
′
N}, and ∀i, j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N}, i > j, we have G(pi′i) < G(pi
′
j).
Algorithm 1 demonstrates the concrete procedure to
generate the final group division scheme Λ. Because our
partitioning method is designed to protect the privacy of
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Algorithm 1 Partitioning the hexagons into groups
Require: The side information S, the hexagons set
{pi1, pi2, . . . , piN}, the population of each hexagon
{α1, α2, . . . , αN}
Ensure: final group set Λ
1: L← ∅; //initialize a list.
2: Λ← ∅; // initialize the final group set.
3: for i← 1 to N do




8: n ← L.length;V ← L; // V represents the candidate
sets
9: sort(L); //sort the list according to the population with
descending order.
10: mark ← {True}n; //initialize an array with Boolean
type.
11: for i : 0→ n− 1 do
12: if mark[i] == True then
13: /* call for algorithm to determine group G con-
taining the current hexagon ∗/
14: G← select(L[i], V );
15: for pi in G do
16: mark[pi] = False; //mark all the selected
hexagon False
17: end for
18: V ← (V −G);






users, these hexagons with no population is not taken into
consideration. In lines 3−7, we add the nonempty hexagons
to a List. Then, Lines 11 − 23 shows that the hexagon with
a higher priority begins to select hexagons which are not
selected by other users. In Line 9, the hexagons are sorted in
descending order according to the population and thus, the
hexagon with the highest population select hexagons first.
In line 14, a hexagon selects these ungrouped hexagons and
form a new group. This process is implemented in a greedy
algorithm.
Algorithm 2 shows the concrete process to determine the
final group that best matches an input hexagon pi. In lines
4− 9, we get the hexagon candidates first. In the sorted list
containing the input hexagon, we derive the Πmax hexagons
left the hexagon and Πmax hexagons right the hexagon as
the candidates. This is based on the observation that the
entropy in equation (2) reaches its maximum when each of
the probability are equal, which implies that hexagons with
similar query probability can better protect each other. This
process reduces the search space and reduces the complexity
of the algorithm
On line 10, we randomly select βΛmax candidates where
β is the control parameter ranging from 1 to 2. This process
is designed to add some randomness to the result for fear of
these attackers who know the privacy protection mechanism
and infer the true location of the user with the generated
dummy locations.
In line 11−22, the selection of hexagons goes in a greedy-
based manner. The hexagon is added to a group one by
one and these which can better augment the entropy of the
group are added to the group first.
Algorithm 2 The Greedy Algorithm to select hexagon
Require: The input hexagon pi,the query probability for
each hexagon pi is p(pi), the left ordered hexagon list
V = {pi1, pi2, . . . , pik}
Ensure: the final group G
1: G← ∅; //initialize a list
2: G.append(pi);
3: count← 1;// count the number of hexagon in G
4: V
′ ← ∅; // initialize the candidates set
5: index←GetIndex(pi, V );








10: V ′ ← V ′ .RandomSelect(βΛmax);
11: while count < Πmax do
12: bestcandidate← 0; maxentro← 0;
13: for pii in V
′ −G do
14: entro← H(G ∪ pii)−H(G);










In this subsection, we prove that our proposed method is
immune to the inference attack from the untrusted LBS
provider. In the following discussion, the attacker is re-
stricted to the untrusted LBS provider with side informa-
tion. The attacker knows the query probability of the given
area and also the mechanism of how the dummy locations
are generated and how the groups are formed. The true
location is free from the inference attack when it is not
distinguishable from the dummy locations. The proposed
method divides the area by hexagons and when we infer
the hexagon that a user on, we get the true location of the
user. Formally, to prove our proposed method is reasonable,
we turn to the following definition.
Definition 3. A privacy protection method is inference attack
resistant from the untrusted LBS provider if ∀i, j, i 6= j and
i, i = 1, 2, . . . , k, we have
Pr(pii ∈ Λ|Λ ⊂ Ψ) = Pr(pij ∈ Λ|Λ ⊂ Ψ) (9)
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To prove the proposed method is free from the inference
attack from the untrusted LBS provider, according to the
definition (3), we have




Pr(Λ ⊂ Ψ) .
Since pii ∈ Λ and pij ∈ Λ, the method is effective when qi =
qj holds. As our proposed method is aimed at maximize the
entropy and this guarantee the equality between qi and qj .
In our method, the user get the information shared from
the proxy and thus is free from the inference attack from
the LBS provider. The attacker also understands the location
privacy protection mechanism and knows how the groups
are formed and thus infer the true location of the proxy.
However, in algorithm 2, we add randomness to the dummy
locations generating process and thus ensure the security of
the proxy.
6 COST SHARING MECHANISM BETWEEN USERS
In this section, we start to solve the problem which user
in the partitioned group undertakes the task to generate
dummy locations and share the returned results with other
users. A cost sharing mechanism is proposed to minimize
the cost of generating dummy locations and meanwhile
stimulate the users in the area to participate in the coalition.
The proposed mechanism satisfies both incentive compati-
bility and budget balance.
6.1 Mechanism Design
For k-anonymity based methods, in our method, we select a
user ui from the group G = {u1, u2, . . . , u|G|} to undertake
the task of generating the dummy locations and sharing re-
turned results. This process is based on the assumption that
the selected user is trusted. Moreover, the task is inevitable
accompanied with a certain amount of cost such as energy
consumption, communication and computation. We use ci
denote these cost for ui. In fact, it is not reasonable to let
a user undertake all the cost. We propose a mechanism
to determine which user undertake the task and receive
payment from others in the group as the compensation.
In this paper, an auction mechanism is explored to deter-
mine which user in the group G is to undertake the task and
how to allocate the cost. In our auction, LBS users are both
bidders and auctioneers. The user who wins the auction can
act as the proxy and undertakes the task. The mechanism is
mainly composed of the following three steps:
• every participant in the auction reports his bids;
• the one with the least bid is selected as the winner;
• other users in the group give a certain amount of
payment to the winner as the compensation.
The valuation of different users varies and this infor-
mation is private in the auction. We use vi denotes the
private valuation of ui. Therefore, we have vi = ci. Mean-
while, each user ui has a reported bid bi. We use vector
~b = {b1, b2, . . . , b|G|} denotes the reported bids of the group
G and use b−i denotes the profile of all the users except
ui, namely b−i = {b1, b2, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , b|G|}. Hence,
~b = (bi, b−i). In the auction, the winner is selected as the
proxy and get payments from others.
Definition 4. A allocation function fi : Θ → {0, 1} is a
indicator function which determines whether or not user ui is the
winner, where Θ stands for all the possible combination of reported
bid bi, formally Θ = Θ1 ×Θ2 × . . .×Θ|G|.
Definition 5. A payment function gi : Θ → R+ denotes the
payment the winner will receive from user i as a compensation.
Let v∗ denotes the final selling price of the winner. Since
the target of our mechanism is to maximize equation (7),
the final selling price of each group should be as little as
possible. In order to achieve this goal, each user should
report the true cost as the bid. To stimulate the user to report
the real cost, the user should obtain the optimal utility when
the user report his true preference. The following definition
formally describes this property that the mechanism should
meet.
Definition 6. A mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility
[31] if for any other reported bid b
′
i and other LBS users strategy
profile b−i, there exists bi 6= b′i so that
ui(bi, b−i) ≥ ui(b′i, b−i), (10)
where ui(bi, b−i) represents the utility ui obtains when the
reported bid of the group is (bi, b−i).
When we determine the compensation paid to the win-
ner, on the one hand the compensation should be greater
than the cost; on the other hand, we hope the cost is
minimized. To describe this target, we turn to the following
definition.
Definition 7. A mechanism satisfies budget balance [31] if the




gi(b) = 0. (11)
According to this definition, a mechanism satisfying the
budget balance means that it never takes a loss nor makes a
profit.
6.2 Proposed Mechanism
To stimulate the users in a group to generate dummy
locations and share data, a cost sharing mechanism satisfies
incentive compatibility and budget balance is needed. the
Arrow-d Aspremont-Gerard-Varet (AGV) mechanism [33]
can satisfies the above two property. Therefore, we design
a cost sharing mechanism based on AGV mechanism. The
auction is divided into two key steps.
Fig.3 demonstrates the auction model and we suppose
the auctioneer is the trusted independent third party [34].
First, all the users act as bidders and participate in the auc-
tion by submitting their reported bids ~b = {b1, b2, . . . , b|G|}
to the auctioneer. The first step is to determine the winner
who undertake the task and the auctioneer is the trusted
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Fig. 3. Auction model with special property
Fig. 4. The execution procedure of the cost sharing mechanism
independent third party who compares the bids and de-
cides the winner. Since we just need to select one user to
undertake the privacy protection task and any user in the
group share the same privacy level, the user with least bids
is preferred. Therefore, the allocation function fi(b) can be
calculated by the following formula:
fi(~b) =
{
0 if bi > minj 6=i{bj},
1 if bi ≤ minj 6=i{bj}.
(12)
Equation (12) illustrates that ui is the winner when fi(~b) =
1, otherwise not. Thus, the user with least reported bid
is selected when every user can provide the same privacy
level. When there exists two user submit the same reported
bid, we just select one randomly as the final unique winner.
The second key step is to determine the payment for
each user in the group as the compensation for the cost of
the winner, who generates dummy locations and acts as the
proxy to share returned results with other users. One the
one hand, these payments should compensate for the cost of
the winner; one the other hand, to minimize the cost of pri-
vacy protection, the mechanism should satisfies the budget
balance. As is mentioned in [35], an incentive mechanism
satisfies incentive compatibility does’t necessarily satisfies
the budget balance, especially for the strong degree of
incentive compatibility. However, other mechanisms, such
as AVG, satisfies these two property at the same time. In
our situation, the vi is a random variable and follows some
distribution Di. Moreover, we refers to a term, the expected
social welfare, which is given as




Then, the payment for each user ui can be calculated by the
following reverse formula:




For the winner, gi > 0, otherwise, the user should pay a
certain amount of money as the compensation. As a result,
the proposed auction mechanism balance the budget and
ensure the interests for those who generate dummy loca-
tions. The concrete execution process of the proposed mech-
anism is demonstrated in the Fig.4. Algorithm 3 presents
the concrete process about the cost sharing. The algorithm
mainly contains two section: in line 4 − 9, the winner is
selected; in line 10 − 13, the payment of each user in the
group is computed.
Algorithm 3 The cost sharing mechanism
Require: Set of usersG = {u1, u2, . . . , u|G|}, set of reported
bids ~b
Ensure: The winner w and the cost allocation vector ~g
1: w ← 0;
2: ~g ← {0}|G|;
3: α← +∞;
4: for i : 1→ |G| do
5: if bi < α then




10: for i : 1→ |G| do
11: ESW−i(bi)← Eb−i [
∑|G|
j 6=i vjfj(~b)];






The proposed mechanism satisfies both incentive compati-
bility and budget balance, which is given by the following
theorems, respectively.
Theorem 1. Our proposed cost sharing mechanism satisfies the
Bayesian incentive compatibility.
Theorem 2. Our proposed cost sharing mechanism satisfies the
budget balance.
The concrete proof the the Theorem (1) (2) is omitted.
The theorem 1 demonstrates that our proposed mechanism
can ensure that the winner who undertakes the task won’t
lose his interest. It is important to stimulate the users in the
group to participate in the auction. Theorem (2) indicates
that the auction won’t bring in extra income for the winner,
which minimize the average cost for the privacy protection.
2377-3782 (c) 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TSUSC.2017.2733018, IEEE
Transactions on Sustainable Computing
IEEE TRANSACTION ON SUSTAINABLE COMPUTING 9
7 EXPERIMENT EVALUATIONS
In this section, we conduct an experiment and evaluate the
performance of the proposed method.
7.1 Dataset Description
To simulate the mobility, we use the dataset GeoLife [36],
which is shown in Fig.5. This dataset is composed of the
GPS trajectory data ,which was collected for over five years
by MSRA (Microsoft Research Asia) with 182 participants.
These trajectories are sorted according to the user and for
each user, a trajectory is saved in a file. The trajectory of each
user is organized as a series of 4-tuple, namely the latitude,
longitude, altitude and the time stamp, which is ordered by
time stamp.
Fig. 5. Dataset overview in Beijing [36]
To approximate the history query to the LBS server,
we use the dataset from Dianping [37]. Without loss of
generality, we use the total number of comments to the
PoIs in certain area to approximate the query probability of
LBS users. Fig.6 shows the PoIs in Beijing is not uniformly
distributed, the areas in the circles have higher density of
the PoIs.
7.2 Simulation Setup
In the experiments, we select users and PoIs within a rectan-
gle area of which the latitude ranges from 39.949 to 39.994
and the longitude ranges from 116.304 to 116.384. For the
side information of inference attack, we use the total com-
ments to PoI in a certain area as the query probability. The
query probability of these areas without comment record is
set as 0 by default.
The parameter k is related with the privacy level in the
k−anonymity method and in our experiment the value of
k ranges from 2 to 10. The cost of each user to generate
dummy locations follows a uniform distribution, ranging
from 10 to 20.
Fig. 6. Distribution of PoIs in Beijing
Technically, we conducted our experiment in a HANA
cluster environment [38] . The proposed services are dis-
tributed in the cluster. As a result of making full potential of





Hardware Lenovo Master (1 node): HP Z800
ThinkpadT430 Workstation Intel(R)Multi-Core
machine with X5690 Xeon(R), 3.47GHz/12M
Intel i5-3210M Cache, 6cores, 2 CPUs,
2.50GHz 128GB (8x8GB+4X16GB) DDR3
processor, 1066MHz ECC Reg RAM,
8GB RAM 2TB 7.2K RPM SATA Hard Drive
and 250GB Slave (1 node): HP Z800
Hard Disk. Workstation Intel(R) Multi-Core
X5690 Xeon(R), 3.47GHz/12M
Cache, 6cores, 2 CPUs,
1066MHz ECC Reg RAM,
128GB (8x8GB+4X16GB) DDR3
2TB 7.2K RPM SATA Hard Drive
Software Windows 7 SUSE Enterprise Linux
Professional Server 11 SP3 and
64bit OS and SAP HANA Platform SP07
HANA Studio.
7.3 Evaluation Result
First, we focus on the privacy protection performance of the
different dummy locations generation methods. We use a
certain selected location as reference. We use the method
proposed in [39], which randomly selects dummy locations.
As as shown in Fig.7, our proposed method approximates
the optimal condition and outperforms the baseline. The
optimal condition comes when each of the dummy locations
has the same query probability and the probability that a
user exposes to privacy leaks is identically 1k . Our method
approximates the baseline because hexagons with similar
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Fig. 7. The probability of exposing location privacy leaks with different
number of generated dummy locations
Fig. 8. The entropy with different number of generated dummy locations
probability are selected as the dummy locations to each
other. Moreover, as more dummy locations are generated, all
of the three methods can effectively alleviate the probability
of exposing to privacy leaks. Fig.8 demonstrates that our
proposed method can achieve a higher privacy protection
level than that of baseline when a user generates the same
number of dummy locations. Moreover, Fig.7 and Fig.8 also
indicate that the proposed method is more stable when the
number of dummy locations rises.
Second, we focus on the privacy protection performance
of our division schema. The baseline divides the users into
groups in a random way. Fig.9 shows that our proposed
scheme can reach a higher privacy level when compared
with baseline. Moreover, our greedy-based method can have
a comparably more smooth improvement of entropy as the
group size rises. The Fig.9 also indicates that whatever the
group division method, a user on average can better obtain
a higher privacy level when the user is in a group of bigger
Fig. 9. The average entropy as the size of each group rises
Fig. 10. Entropy reached of each group using 3−anonymity
size. The high privacy level on average does’t ensure the
privacy level of each individual and a privacy protection
method should not sacrifice the interests of each individual.
We also concern the privacy level of each group. Fig.10 and
Fig.11 show our proposed schema provide a privacy level
to each group. The distribution of the entropy reached by
our proposed method is more concentrated than that of
baseline method. This is achieved by rationally partitioning
hexagons according to the history query probability.
At last, we concern about the cost of the privacy protec-
tion. Given entropy, Fig.12 indicates that the cost decreases
as the number of users increases. The probability of user
with lower cost arises as the number of users increases.
To measure the privacy protection performance for given
budget, we use the P-C (Privacy level-Cost) ratio as the
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Fig. 11. Entropy reached of each group using 5−anonymity
Fig. 12. Cost as the number of users increases
where Hi denotes the entropy-measured privacy level for
user i and costi is the expenses of privacy protection for
user i. Fig.13 shows the P-C ratio of our proposed method
outperforms the baseline method among different groups,
which means that our method reaches a higher privacy level
when given the cost is the same. We also find that the P-C
ratio varies among different group, which is caused by the
difference of population. Users in the groups which have a
higher population can enjoy a higher privacy level with a
lower cost.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have studied the privacy protection prob-
lem for LBS using k−anonymity. For privacy protection,
the level is often measured by entropy and generally the
query probability varies among different places. With this
side information, the attacker can readily narrow down the
search space when launching the inference attack.
Fig. 13. P-C ratio among different groups
Faced with this challenge, in this paper, we propose a
cost sharing schema. We first divide the area into small
groups by maximizing the total entropy in order to maxi-
mize the users’ privacy. Moreover we have studied the cost
sharing problem to determine which LBS user to generate
k − 1 dummy trajectories and receive the payments from
the others. At first, we have constructed an auction based
model, in which each LBS user as a bidder, reports his cost
and dummy trajectories. Then, we have proposed a cost
sharing mechanism for location privacy preservation in LBS.
Next, we have demonstrated that our mechanism satisfies
incentive compatibility and budget balance.
To verify that the proposed method is effective, we carry
out experiments on real dataset GeoLife and dianping.
The experiments proves that our method can achieve a
higher privacy level when the cost is the same. Meanwhile,
individuals of different groups have a similar privacy level.
We also notice the value of k is important when bal-
ancing the privacy level and the cost for dummy locations
generation. A larger value of k would certainly enhance the
privacy level. However, it will also inevitably incur some
extra cost. Hence, we are going to have an research on the
determination of k in our future work.
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